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Abstract
Critics have repeatedly claimed that heterodox economics has failed in that it has lim-
ited acceptance by the mainstream of the economics profession and little influence on
other approaches and policies. They blame heterodox economists for their own failure. I
subject this claim to critical examination from the perspective of Veblen’s evolutionary
methodology. Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise will be used as an example, which
exemplifies the case that a ‘blasphemous’ theory is ignored and marginalized even though
it provides rich insights into economy and society. Heterodox economics has shown a
similar path. It is also argued that social science does not follow the biological principle
of natural selection. What survives does not necessarily mean the fittest in the social
realm. The history of science is replete with paradoxical incidents that an incoherent,
irrelevant, or even wrong theory becomes dominant and widely accepted because it is one
that serves the vested interests in academia and society. Economics is no exception.
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1 Introduction: The Failure of Heterodox Economics?
There is a perennial claim that heterodox economics has failed. What does it mean by the
failure of heterodox economics? Most recently, an eminent evolutionary economist, Geoffrey
Hodgson (2019), argues that the heterodox economics community has failed to “establish
sufficient consensus over core issues and to develop alternative positions of power within
academia” (4) and that “unrestricted tolerance of diversity [or excessive pluralism] within
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heterodoxy leads to a failure of quality control” (151). Other heterodox economists have
also made a similar argument that heterodox economics has failed in the sense that, for
example, it has only limited acceptance by the mainstream of the economics profession and
little influence on other approaches and policies. Their diagnosis is that the failure is due
to, among others, heterodox economists’ self-marginalization within the economics discipline,
antagonism against the mainstream economics, insufficient consensus over core ideas (and,
not to mention, on the label, ‘heterodox’ economics), and a heavy ideological bias. They also
suggest remedies to overcome the failure and to have a better future. Just to mention notable
strategies: give up the label ‘heterodox’; engage conversation with mainstream economists
(in particular, mainstream dissenters); reorient heterodox research from a ‘generalist mission’
(e.g., research on methodology and philosophy; aiming to replace neoclassical orthodoxy) to
a ‘specialized’ mission (e.g., research on institutions or money); engage with other disciplines
(e.g., philosophy, law, sociology, political science), and so on (see, for example Colander, Holt
and Rosser 2004, 2007-8; Fontana and Gerrad 2006; Holt, Rosser and Colander 2011; Rosser,
Colander and Holt 2013; Hodgson 2019).
Apart from the ambiguity of the meaning of failure/success, the above critiques are prob-
lematic for multiple reasons (as discussed in detail later). A general problem of note is that
critics, be they mainstream or heterodox, “blame the victims for their own marginalization
and demise” (Lee 2013, 120). It is not to say that heterodox economists themselves are not re-
sponsible for the limited acceptance/influence and the lack of their research quality, but that
critics overlook the institutional arrangements within economics which have systemically sup-
pressed heterodox economics. The history of economics is abound with external pressures and
attacks on heterodox economics via the processes of hiring, promotion, publication, research
evaluation and funding, etc., which have hampered the development of heterodox economics
and marginalized heterodox economics within economics (Lee 2009). History reveals that
economics is not a ‘free’ market of ideas in which, as mainstream economists believe, ‘ratio-
nal’ economists make optimal use of scarce scientific resources which leads to the progress
in economics (see, for example, Wible 1998). Economics is a contested discipline in which
its prevailing institutions are biased toward the dominant mainstream economics. In such
an academic landscape it is obvious that the mainstream economics deliberately marginal-
izes heterodox economics by way of controlling and perpetuating the institutions. Those
critics who accuse heterodox economists for their ‘failure’ tend to overlook how economics
has evolved, how heterodox economics has survived, and how academic institutions generate
unfavorable conditions for heterodox economics.
The debate on the nature and future of heterodox economics has been ongoing and we should
not avoid this debate if we are concerned with the future of heterodox economics. Instead
of repeating what has already been said, in this essay I subject some of heterodox critics’
arguments to critical examination from the perspective of Veblen’s evolutionary methodology.
Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise will be used as an example, which exemplifies the
case that a ‘blasphemous’ theory is ignored and marginalized even though it provides rich
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insights into economy and society. Heterodox economics has followed a similar path. It is also
argued that social science does not follow the biological principle of natural selection. What
survives does not necessarily mean the fittest in the social realm. The history of science
is replete with paradoxical incidents that an incoherent, irrelevant, or even wrong theory
becomes dominant and widely accepted because it is one that serves the vested interests in
academia and society. Economics is no exception.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, Veblen’s evolutionary methodology is sum-
marized to highlight its distinctive way of thinking with regard to the evolution and evaluation
of theory. In Section 3, Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise is discussed focusing on
its methodological characteristics, essential arguments, and implications. In Section 4, the
implications of Veblen’s evolutionary methodology and theory for heterodox economics are
discussed. In the last section, the main arguments of the paper are highlighted.
2 Veblen’s Evolutionary Methodology
Veblen’s general evolutionary approach, no doubt inspired by, inter alia, Darwin’s evolution-
ary biology, concerns primarily with “a cumulatively unfolding process or an institutional
adaptation to cumulatively unfolding exigencies” (Veblen 1900/1961c, 173). His evolutionary
economics is defined accordingly as “the theory of a process of cultural growth as determined
by the economic interest, a theory of cumulative sequence of economic interactions stated
in terms of the process itself” (Veblen 1898/1961e, 77). Evolutionary economics so defined
is positioned against pre-modern or pre-Darwinian taxonomy whose concern centers on the
equilibrium end-state (Veblen 1908/1961a).
For Veblen, evolution is, as I interpret it, thus viewed as an uncertain, open-ended socio-
historical process. The speed of the process is either gradual or rapid. The direction is
indetermined a priori. This is at odds with Spencerian evolutionism that “[p]rogress ... is
not an accident, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of the embryo or
the unfolding of flower” (Spencer 1851, 65). Evolution is ‘uncertain’ in the sense that, like
Keynes’s concept of fundamental uncertainty, purposeful strategic actions of human beings
do not necessarily end up with the desired state. Veblen’s view of evolution is similar to
the Marx’s notion of history that “Men make their own history, but they do not make it as
they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances
existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations
weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (Marx 1852).
Nothing is static or natural or universal or normal in the socio-historical process. There
is no equilibrium state, either provisional or permanent, in a world that is constantly in
motion. More to the point, human beings are distinguished from animals since the former
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are intelligent as well as instinctive creatures making institutions—habits of thought and
organizations—to cope with uncertain exigencies in the surrounding environment. Intelli-
gence (knowledge and technology), instincts, and institutions are social constructions. They
do not emerge or function in a social vacuum. Socially constructed knowledge, instincts,
and institutions are translated into actions, which in turn change the former in the course
of history. Evolution in Veblen’s theoretical system is thus an open-ended uncertain process
not because of natural laws or biological traits, but because of purposeful actions of making
and changing institutions. It is the “transformative social agency” that drives changes in
the social domain (Lawson 2003, 116, 129). In this regard, Veblen’s evolutionary approach is
distinguished from classical and ‘neoclassical’ economics, both of which are taxonomic and
teleological. As such, Veblen’s evolutionism does not rely exclusively on the Darwinian bio-
logical evolutionary principles since Veblen is concerned with the evolution of institutions in
the socio-historical context (Veblen 1900/1961c, 1908/1961a; Anderson 1933; Jennings and
Waller 1998; Argyrous and Sethi 1996; Jo 2019b).
The distinctive character of Veblen’s evolutionary methodology can easily be noticed if it
is contrasted, as Veblen did, to utilitarian-marginalist economics. Veblen recognized that
utilitarian-marginalist economics was incompatible with evolutionary economics since the
former is static, taxonomic, teleological, and hedonistic. Veblen also pointed out a method-
ological contradiction in what he called ‘neo-classical’ economics, in particular the economics
of Marshall who represents “the later development in the classical line of political economy”
(Veblen 1900/1961c, 171, 261). While Marshall held an (Spencerian) evolutionary viewpoint,1
his theory was marginalist and method was taxonomic and teleologic. This contradiction be-
tween or inconsistent mixture of the evolutionary vision and the taxonomic theory is what
Veblen captured by naming it “neoclassical” economics—both continuity and departure from
taxonomic classical economics. Lawson (2013/2016, 53) notes that:
the defining feature of all neoclassical economics is basically an inconsistent blend
of the old and the new; it is in effect an awareness of the new of metaphysics of
processual cumulative or unfolding causation, combined with a failure to break
away from methods of the older taxonomic view of science that are in tension
with this modern ontology.
The contradiction was not resolved by Marshall insofar as Principles (1890/1920) is con-
cerned. Instead, Marshall developed marginalist theory around such concepts as relative
scarcity, optimizing behavior and rational choice, equilibrium, competition under a hypothet-
ical notion of the ‘normal conditions of life,’ assuming that the capitalist social relationships
1Marshall’s evolutionary thinking was largely influenced by Herbert Spencer, rather than by Charles Dar-
win, as evidenced by Marshall’s biological analogies of the survival of the fittest and natural selection as
if economy and society resemble the natural realm (Marshall 1890/1920, 241; Hodgson 2004; Jennings and
Waller 1998; Laurent 2000; (Jo 2019b)).
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and institutional arrangements (e.g., the market structure) are fixed. This assumption, as
manifest in the analogy of “the trees of the forest” (Marshall 1890/1920, 315), makes the
separation of Marshall’s marginalist theory from ever-evolving society possible, as if the lat-
ter (i.e., “the forest”) does not change and thereby it can be ignored. The separation in
turn led later neoclassical economists not only to discard the evolutionary vision to save the
marginalist theory, but also to re-introduce evolutionary thinking in a perfunctory manner
to defend/expand their marginalist theory. The latter is exemplified by the evolution of the
neoclassical firm theory after the marginalist controversy in the 1940s and 1950s (more on
this later).
In light of Veblen’s nomenclature, thus, marginalists are not neoclassical. Instead, New in-
stitutional economics (e.g., Williamson, North), new evolutionary economics (e.g., Nelson
and Winter), and evolutionary game theory (e.g., John Maynard Smith, Bowles and Gintis)
that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s fall into Veblen’s ‘neoclassical’ economics in the sense
that they, like Marshall, bear an “air of evolutionism.” In other words, above-mentioned ap-
proaches are “quasi-evolutionary” or quasi-institutional economics which presumes normality
and fixity of the system in which transformative social agency and its reciprocal-cumulative
relationship with institutions are replaced by optimizing individuals (Veblen 1900/1961c, 175,
178; Veblen 1898/1961e; Dugger 1995; Finch and McMaster 2018; Fine 2019; Jo 2019b). For
example, in Nelson and Winter (1982) the evolutionary process becomes a fictitious history
as expressed in the probabilistic Markov process and the simulation experiment in which
purposeful human actions play no role. Such an approach, from Veblen’s viewpoint, cannot
be the evolutionary account of economy and society. Therefore, Veblen calls for discarding
the marginalist approach as well as the quasi-evolutionary approach if economics is to be an
evolutionary science (Veblen 1898/1961e).
The flip side of Veblen’s argument, however, is that economics is not likely to be an evolu-
tionary science (although Veblen hoped otherwise):
[s]o long as the habitual view taken of a given range of facts is of the taxonomic
kind and the material lends itself to treatment by that method, the taxonomic
method is the easiest, gives the most gratifying immediate results, and best fits
into the accepted body of knowledge of the range of facts in question. ... The well-
worn paths are easy to follow and lead into good company. (Veblen 1898/1961e,
79)
Drawing upon Veblen’s argument and his evolutionary methodology I will deal with the issue
of evolution and evaluation of theory in the following section.
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2.1 Evolution and Evaluation of Theory
Veblen’s evolutionary approach described thus far bears profound implications for the evo-
lution of theory and scientific enterprise undertaken by economists. Scientific enterprise is a
deliberate human activity creates useful, false, or destructive knowledge and technology of
the life process. Whether a knowledge is useful or destructive depends upon the environment
in which the knowledge is created and used for a particular purpose (e.g., nuclear fission used
for power plants and bombs). That is to say, scientific enterprise and resulting knowledge
cannot be separated from social environment and from the prevailing habits of thought and
preconceptions. On the relationship between science and society Veblen notes that “science
and the scientific point of view [i.e., preconceptions of scientists] will vary characteristically in
response to those variation in the prevalent habits of thought which constitute the sequence
of cultural development” (Veblen 1908/1961a, 38).
No knowledge is created or developed individually. Knowledge is “of the nature of common
stock, held and carried forward collectively by the community ... an affair of the collectivity,
not a creative achievement of individuals working self-sufficiently in severalty or in isolation”
(Veblen 1914/1964b, 103). The community is a social institution which initiates, maintains,
and/or promote a particular scientific point of view. Individuals belonging to the community
(including academic ones) are not independent of the prevalent habits, or preconceptions, of
that community (Veblen 1906/1961b; Tilman 2007, 18). The “question of a scientific point
of view, of a particular attitude and animus in matters of knowledge, is a question of the
formation of habits of thought” (Veblen 1908/1961a, 38). Veblen’s evolutionary methodology
implies that the continued survival and progress of theory is not guaranteed since it requires
favorable institutional arrangements as well as well-functioning scientific communities which
lend support to scientific enterprise of creating and expanding the joint stock of community
knowledge of the life process.2 To put it another way, failure or success of a theory is not
2The concept of the ‘joint stock of community knowledge’ warrants some elaboration as it is relevant to our
discussion of the evolution of theory and of knowledge. The stock of (technological and managerial) knowledge
animates resources (and, of course, requires resources to conduct scientific enterprise). That is to say, whether
any resource is useful or not depends upon the joint stock of knowledge; and by the same token some previously
utilized resources become obsolete when new knowledge is created and accepted. In this regard, “Resources
are not, they become; they are not static but expand and contract in response to human wants and acts”
(Zimmermann 1933/1951, 15). Two important theoretical implications can be drawn from the evolutionary
view of resources. Firstly, if all knowledge is socially created, it is not possible to single out one individual’s
‘productivity’ from another’s in the process of production. Labor, natural inputs, and the produced means of
production become productive factors because of technological and managerial knowledge in place. ‘Capital’
or ‘labor’ alone cannot be productive in and by itself. The joint stock of knowledge accumulated from the past
determines the kind of inputs and the ratio between inputs. Thus it is not possible to have the neoclassical
production function with variable input proportions, marginal productivity, and hence profit maximization
from the evolutionary perspective (Veblen 1914/1964b, 103, 144; Lee 2018, 43-45). Secondly, the assumption
of scarce resources is a non-evolutionary, static concept which presumes the fixed system of nature and society
and the absence of transformative social agency. Some evolutionary-institutional economists, however, assume
‘local and global scarcity’ (Hodgson 2019, 54), the concept of which is at odds with this evolutionary point
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entirely determined by its consistency, coherence, and relevance, since the acceptance of
theory depends on its conformity to the prevailing institutions and preconceptions. Under
such circumstances a valid or relevant theory may be accepted, but only to the extent it can
be molded into an accepted form.
From the Veblen’s evolutionary perspective, it is therefore readily conceivable that “a non-
evolutionary conception of the economic process can take hold and persist precisely because
theories can become self-propagating and self-entrenching in an evolutionary manner. ... A
model which applies tools which are already widely in use, or appeals by way of analogy to
exiting work, is clearly favoured” (Argyrous and Sethi 1996, 491). Thus the development of
a particular theory is not only path-dependent but also uncertain due to change-resistant or
‘ceremonial’ habits of thought and prevailing scientific practice within the community.
To illustrate this point, consider major debates in economics, such as the empty boxes debate
in the 1920s, the marginalist debate in the 1940s-50s, the administered price controversy
in the 1930s–70s, and the capital controversy in the 1950s-70s. These debates questioned
inherent errors and flaws in mainstream economics. However, the debates have not led
mainstream economists to correct errors and flaws in theory. The financial crisis of 2008 also
revealed the irrelevance of mainstream theories and models as wells as the irresponsibility
of mainstream economists. But they have not changed the way they theorize and model
the real world. Instead, mainstream economists either ignored the flaws (e.g., the empty
boxes debates and the capital controversy), modified their theories and models to escape
the attacks from heterodox economists (e.g., the marginalist debate), or just ignored the
entire debate as if it has never happened (e.g., the administered price debate). As a result,
mainstream economics has become more flexible without losing its worldview and methods—
that is, methodological individualism, deductivisim, mathematical formalism based upon such
axiomatic preconceptions as scarce resources, rationality, optimizing behavior, the market
price mechanism. It is a myth that scientists, especially mainstream economists, are able to
correct errors themselves and hence that all the widely-received theories are the best possible
ones (Yalcintas 2016).
Is it not absurd that mainstream economics, allegedly ‘the queen of social sciences,’ is inca-
pable of correcting its own errors and creating better knowledge? If mainstream economics
is looked from the Veblenian lens, the incapability of self-correcting errors, irrelevance of the-
ory, and irresponsibility of mainstream economists make good sense. As noted above, as the
prevalent ceremonial habits of thought remain unaltered, so do the scientific point of view
and scientific enterprise. In other words, if the habitual approach is taxonomic economics, a
theory must conform to axiomatic preconceptions or propositions “concerning the normal re-
of view. Veblen’s and Zimmermann’s argument is not simply about the temporal, individual, or locational
availability of a resource. It is about the creation and use of resources that depends upon the accumulated
joint stock of knowledge and the decision to generate specific knowledge for a particular purpose. Knowledge
is in its nature social and historical-evolutionary.
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lations of things” (Veblen 1898/1961e, 67) if it is to be received by the dominant mainstream
of economics profession. A ‘heterodox’ theory, therefore, is to be rejected by the mainstream
economists, because they are trained to ignore any concerns other than taxonomic theory
and method, like business people are trained to discard anything other than pecuniary inter-
ests under the pecuniary culture (Veblen 1914/1964b, 347). Such a “trained incapacity” of
economists is socially created and managed through the establishment of academic institu-
tions (Veblen 1918/1957, 152; Wais 2005).
What Veblen’s evolutionary approach implies is that the success and failure of a particular
economic approach rests with the institutional arrangement of the time—e.g., publication,
hiring, promotion, and research funding—which have been unfavorable to heterodox eco-
nomics for many decades. It is thus wrong to assume that a heterodox theory is treated,
evaluated, and judged on an equal footing with a mainstream theory since the prevailing
academic institutions are dominated and controlled by mainstream economists, and that the
relevance and validity of a heterodox theory seeking a causal explanation of the economic life
process is fully grasped and appraised by mainstream economists who are occupied exclusively
with the deductive mathematical-taxonomic method.
A scientific evaluation of an academic work, from Veblen’s viewpoint, should not be based
upon logical consistency alone. It should be judged in a comprehensive manner with particular
regard to coherence, correspondence, comprehensiveness, and relevance (Eichner 1983, 206-
210), which can hardly be measured by the number of citations—allegedly the objective
measure of research quality that is most widely used by the profession and also used by critics
of heterodox economics such as Hodgson (2019). A good economic theory from Veblen’s
point of view is one that explains the cumulative causal mechanisms of the economic life
process taking place in the historical-institutional context. It is therefore erroneous as well
as unscientific to say that heterodox economics has failed because it is not well received by
the majority of economists.
3 Veblen’s Theory of the Business Enterprise
Veblen’s 1904 The Theory of Business Enterprise (TBE) is a major work which exemplifies
his evolutionary approach to economics. In a nutshell TBE is an inquiry into the nature
and evolution of capitalism (or a system of institutions under capitalism) by examining the
motives, objectives, and conduct of the most powerful and dominant institution of capitalist
society, the business enterprise (Anderson 1933; Mayhew 2000, 58-59; Endres 2004; Frigato
and Santos-Arteaga 2012, 73-74; Jo and Henry 2015, 24-28; Jo 2018, 201; Jo 2019a).
Obviously, TBE can hardly be grasped from the mainstream viewpoint. Those who hold
taxonomic, utilitarian, and hedonistic preconceptions would only get superficial understand-
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ing of the Veblen’s theory. One obvious reason is that the firm in the mainstream theory,
as of Alfred Marshall (1890/1920), is an abstract, ahistorical entity, which is presumed to
be socially-beneficial, socially-responsible, and socially-efficient as its optimizing behavior is
conducive to not only maximum profits for the firm itself but also maximum social welfare
if markets are competitive. This conception of the firm is translated into the firm behavior
in the market in which the universal market price mechanism qua the selection mechanism
dictates the behavior of the firm, and hence the priority is given to the market, not the firm.
In other words, “the reduction of the theory of the firm to an automatic signalling system, in
which market prices determine resource allocation and decision making and entrepreneurship
are absent, means that in the [mainstream] theory of the firm there are now no firms” (Kay
1994, 238).
In contrast to the mainstream notion of the firm, Veblen’s business enterprise is J.P. Mor-
gan, Standard Oil Company, and US Steel Corp., Wall Street banking company, etc. It is
a real going concern which emerges, grows or disappears over time and which is organized
and managed for the sake of achieving its goals (Jo and Henry 2015; Jo 2019a). It is a so-
cial organization whose success and failure is tied up with other domains of society through
technical-income relationships. The business enterprise, in particular big corporations which
became large and dominant due to mergers and acquisitions as well as technological devel-
opment (the machine process), is the “master institution” of capitalism (Veblen 1923/1964a,
89), actions of which drive the changes in the capitalist economic system and the welfare of
people therein.
What are the objective and motives of the capitalist business enterprise? The answer to
this question requires the understanding of the nature of the whole system in which the
business enterprise works. The capitalist society Veblen was analyzing is ‘credit economy,’
the social institutions of which were organized in such a way as to make monetary profits
in the interest of the business enterprise and ‘kept classes’—that is, “investors and owners
of capitalized property” or “who derive an income from the established order of ownership
and privilege” (Veblen 1919, 55, 162), as opposed to making serviceable goods and services
in the interest of the underlying population. The business enterprise, as the master of the
credit economy, is created and managed so as to protect and promote the interests of the
kept classes. Credit economy thus replaced ‘money economy’ in which good-making activity
is given priority over money-making activity. The money economy does not adequately
capture the modern capitalist system. But this is the still the system presumed by the
standard mainstream theory. Since social arrangements are in favor of business interests
over industrial interests, Veblen anticipated that society would evolve against the interest
of the underlying population since profits are gained by disrupting industry (e.g., ‘industrial
sabotage’) and hence the material basis of welfare of people becomes dependent upon money-
making activities of the business enterprise (Veblen 1904, ch. 7; see also Jo and Henry 2015).
It is thus obvious that the business enterprise is not socially-beneficial, socially-responsible,
or socially-efficient. If so, the business enterprise is the least-fit from the Veblen’s social
9
evolutionary perspective (Veblen 1914/1964b, 123, 144; Edgell and Tilman 1989, 1009).
As noted, a distinctive feature of TBE is that it is not confined to the business enterprise.
It deals with the entire system of capitalist society centering on the business enterprise and
its related issues such as industry, business, banking, households, the state, business cycles,
crisis, welfare, education, language, policy, politics, and culture. This is one of the reasons
Veblen’s theory was/is neglected by mainstream economists who are concerned exclusively
on the optimizing behavior of the firm in the market context (Mumford 1931, 314). It may
well be that mainstream mathematical tools are too limited to incorporate Veblen’s insights
and that if Veblen’s theory is fully accepted, the entire neoclassical firm theory breaks down.
The latter is the case because, as discussed in the previous section, Veblen was not merely
criticizing the neoclassical-marginalist theory of the firm; rather, he was building his own
theory of the business enterprise from the evolutionary perspective as an alternative to the
neoclassical theory (Anderson 1933; Endres 2004).
What this implies is that even though later development in or expansion of the neoclassical
firm theory, such as new institutional economics (e.g., Williamson) and new evolutionary
economics (e.g., Nelson and Winter), bears the flavor of Veblen’s evolutionary-institutional
economics, they are not able to explicate the evolutionary process in the Veblenian sense.
Consider the new institutionalist theory. The firm is an optimizing organization whose ac-
tivity is constrained by the fixed system of markets governed by the universal market price
mechanism that is imperfect due to positive and significant transaction costs. This firm is
not an active agent or the master institution controlling the market and the society to its own
advantage. It is the same optimizing firm in a more ‘realistic’ setting. The new institutional
firm is still subject to the market mechanism (Dugger 1990; Knoedler 1995; Mayhew 2000;
Jo 2019a). Thus it is injudicious to say that new institutional firms are compatible with the
Veblenian business enterprise (see, for example, Groenewegen 2004, for such an argument).
Similarly, Nelson and Winter (1982) and other economists claim that their evolutionary ap-
proach to the firm is ‘heterodox’ to the extent that it rejects the standard optimization
doctrine and is hence compatible with (and conducive to the development of) the Veble-
nian evolutionary-institutional theory of the business enterprise (see, for example, Foss 1998;
Nightingale and Potts 2003; Hodgson and Knudsen 2004; Becker and Knudsen 2012; Hodg-
son 2007, 2013, 2019). A close examination of Nelson and Winter’s theory, however, reveals
that it entails the Spencerian version of evolutionary change, the Marshallian supply-demand
engine, and Simonian bounded ‘rationality,’ all of which are at odds with Veblen’s evolu-
tionary theory. Veblen’s approach rejects the notion of rationality, be it bounded or not,
and the market price mechanism derived from optimizing behavior. Spencerian evolutionism
which applies biological evolution to the social realm with the doctrine of the survival of the
fittest is also rejected by Veblen (Veblen 1900/1961c, 167, fn. 10; Jennings and Waller 1998;
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Ramstad 1994, 71; Tilman 1996, 32).3 In Nelson and Winter (1982), moreover, the firm is a
semi-automatic, passive entity whose behavior is constrained by rules as if genes determine
the behavior of the living organism and is subject to the market selection mechanism. Nelson
and Winter’s firm is nothing but a ‘bowl of capital-jello,’ a black box, and a production
function as in the standard neoclassical theory (Mirowski 1983/1998, 166; Vromen 1995, 77;
Mayhew 2000, 58). In other words, it is a ‘neoclassical’ evolutionary theory in much the
same sense as Marshall’s economics is a quasi-evolutionary tone of neoclassical economics per
Veblen (Boulding 1984; Mirowski 1983/1998; Ramstad 1994; Vromen 1995, 2001; Mayhew
2000; Watkins 2010; Frigato and Santos-Arteaga 2012; Jo 2019b). In a nutshell, these two
developments in the mainstream theory of the firm demonstrate that they are precisely Fine
(2019)’s examples of the latest phase in “economics imperialism”—namely, “the exclusive
preoccupation with optimisatioin is suspended, but it is not discarded” (139).
4 On Heterodox Economics
The above discussion on the difference between Veblen’s TBE and mainstream theory of
the firm raises a couple of questions pertaining to the meaning and nature of heterodox
economics. What is the reason that some heterodox economists consider heretic mainstream
theory heterodox? And how de we evaluate a theory’s relevance? Let me deal with each
question.
There is no single definition of heterodox economics and of mainstream economics, because
each is an umbrella term referring to a diverse set of approaches in terms of theory, policy, and
methodology. Not to mention even a school of economic thought is often defined differently
if it is composed of diverse sub-groups (e.g., Post Keynesian economics with fundamentalist
Keynesians, Kaleckians, and Sraffians). Less arguable is that the meaning and boundary
of heterodox economics is more ambiguous than that of mainstream economics. This is so
because heterodox economics has a relatively short history.4
3To quote Veblen, “It may be interesting to point out that the like identification of the categories of
normality and right gives the dominant note of Mr. Spencer’s ethical and social philosophy, and that later
economists of the classical line are prone to be Spencerians” (Veblen 1900/1961c, 167). And also: “It is a
notable fact that even the genius of Herbert Spencer could extract nothing but taxonomy from his hedonistic
postulates; e.g., his Social Statics. Spencer is both evolutionist and hedonist, but it is only by recourse to other
factors, alien to the rational hedonistic scheme, such as habit, delusions, use and disuse, sporadic variation,
environment forces, that he is able to achieve anything in the way of genetic science, since it is only by this
recourse that he is enabled to enter the field of cumulative change within which the modern post-Darwinian
science live and move and have their being” (Veblen 1908/1961d, 191-2).
4There are notable events that help popularized the label heterodox economics in the 2000s: the creation
of the Association for Heterodox Economics (1999), the Australian Society of Heterodox Economists (2002),
Heterodox Economics Newsletter (2004), and Heterodox Economics Directory (2005). Of course, the term
‘heterodox’ was used by economists well before 2000s, but the meaning was not quite the same. As a contested
discipline and social science, there always exists the mainstream and heterodoxy. By heterodox economics
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Table 1: Classification of Economics
Heterodox economics is in the process of making its identity as a system of theory, an intellec-
tual community, and a social network that is different from the mainstream economics. This
means that there exist multiple definitions of heterodox economics depending upon author’s
own theoretical and methodological orientations (see Mearman, Berger and Guizzo 2019, for
a variety of views on heterodox economics). The ongoing debate on the meaning and nature
of heterodox economics indicates that it is healthy scientific enterprise with internal diversity.
Various definitions and classifications put forward by heterodox economists can be sorted
into two broad groups (see Table 1). The first group holds that heterodox economics is
methodologically and theoretically different from and independent of mainstream economics
that is originated from neoclassical-marginalist economics (in Veblen’s nomenclature). From
this view heterodox economics encompasses those ‘blasphemous’ schools of economic thought
that have developed their own research agenda and intellectual communities. As such, main-
stream dissenters-heretics who questions and partially amend the core mainstream doctrines
are excluded from heterodox economics (just to mention some recent works from which such
a classification is drawn Lee 2009, 2013; Lavoie 2014; Jo, Chester and D’Ippoliti 2018a; Fine
2019). However, the attempt to exclude the ‘middle ground’ from heterodoxy has often been
countered by other heterodox economists. They have argued that heterodox economics should
embrace dissenters of mainstream economics since their approach deviates from the conven-
I mean here the various schools of thought organized through currently active intellectual communities (see,
Lee 2009, 203-4).
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tional neoclassical doctrines (for example, Colander, Holt and Rosser 2004, 2007-8; Hodgson
2019). The underlying assumption of such an argument is that mainstream economics has
changed and its boundary vis-a`-vis heterodox economics should be redrawn. In his recent
book, Hodgson (2019) defines mainstream economics in terms of the ‘Max U’ doctrine (i.e.,
the utility maximizing agent). Then any research program that rejects Max U is considered to
be heterodox. Therefore, Nelson and Winter’s new evolutionary economics, Herbert Simon’s
bounded rationality and old behavioral approach, evolutionary game theory, for example, can
safely be included in Hodgson’s definition of heterodox economics.
I find that Hodgson’s definition not only narrow but also problematic. Utility maximization
is doubtless one of core doctrines of mainstream economics, which requires, among others,
the assumption of relative scarcity. But Hodgson (2019, 54) does not reject the concept
of scarcity, which is at odds with the evolutionary perspective on resources (see footnote 2
above). Most of streams classified here as mainstream dissenters-heretics do not reject or pay
any attention to the assumption of relative scarcity. Not to mention, while Hodgson (2019)
views ‘Max U’ as the defining characteristics of mainstream economics, he is silent on profit
maximization, cost minimization, equilibrium outcomes, etc. which are as essential as ‘Max
U.’
As discussed above, the core idea of new institutional economics is firm’s ‘minimization’ of
transaction costs in facing imperfect market price mechanism. This is not an alternative to
the mainstream optimization doctrine but a variation of it. Also consider Nelson and Winter
(1982). They reject the ‘standard’ profit maximization assumption to explicate the evolution-
ary selection process, but they do not discard the optimization doctrine entirely. They use
the standard downward sloping demand schedule. It implies that consumers are optimizing
individuals who seek maximum utility. They do not provide a reason why such a demand
curve is assumed. Moreover, “[i]f it [the demand curve] is derived from the constrained max-
imization of utility of individuals, subject to a market clearing condition, then they have
undermined their entire manifesto against orthodox method” (Mirowski 1983/1998, 165).
Max U, the market price mechanism, and the firm as a production function still remain in
the new evolutionary economics, although sometimes these core doctrines are hidden. With
the ‘suspension’ of some core doctrines, “the mainstream economist can claim no longer to be
neoclassical, to have become more realistic, and even to be interdisciplinary and heterodox
in departing from what has gone before” (Fine 2019, 139). This is precisely what Nelson
and Winter (1982) and Hodgson (2019) argue. But the suspension should not be equated to
the giving-up of the mainstream paradigm or to moving toward heterodoxy. The way eco-
nomics has evolved over the past 100 years and the prevailing institutional arrangements in
economics would hardly change the way they theorize economy and they teach economics. It
should also be pointed out that like most mainstream economists, Hodgson (2019) and other
heterodox critics define both heterodox and mainstream economics in terms of “a particular
method of inquiry without ideological, theoretical, or factual content, and without any aim
of analyzing and explaining the provisioning process” (Lee 2013, 116). Consequently, the
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method-oriented definition of economics is independent of history and society, as if there is
an unchanging, universal method that can be applied to ever-changing history and society
or as if history and society never change (as is the case for Marshall, see Section 2 of this
paper).
A problem is that they redefine economics as a science which is separate from economy
and society, which runs counter to the view of economics, including Veblen’s definition of
economics delineated earlier, endorsed by classical political economy most of the heterodox
traditions since the 20th century (Jo and Todorova 2018).
As to the question of evaluating theory, let us again consider Veblen’s TBE and the main-
stream firm theory. If the purpose of a theory is to understand the real-world business
enterprise—that is, its internal strategic decision-making process and its historical evolution
vis-a`-vis the institutional arrangement of the society in question, Veblen’s TBE is most suit-
able. However, if the purpose is to find the (dis)equilibrium condition for firms to maximize
profits in the fixed and given market structure or how the market selects the fit and deselects
the unfit, we must rely on the mainstream theory. In this regard, Veblen’s theory is not a
substitute for the mainstream theory, and vice versa. Nor can one theory be incorporated
into the other. It is not reasonable to evaluate the relevance of Veblen’s TBE from the main-
stream viewpoint. Some authors, however, argue that “Veblen never developed a systematic
theory of the firm, and even less an ‘evolutionary’ theory of the firm (the same could be
said of his institutionalist followers)” (Foss 1998, 479). Such a judgment is predicated on the
preconception that to be an alternative theory it should be similar to the mainstream theory
in terms of method, scope, and language (Jo 2019a). Furthermore, it is assumed that the
mainstream theory is ‘scientific’ or valid and hence that the reference point of evaluating a
heterodox theory is the mainstream theory.
But what’s obvious is that, as discussed in previous sections, Veblen’s TBE cannot be sepa-
rated from history and society, while the Marshallian-mainstream firm theory is based upon
‘mental constructs’ and hence ahistorical (Henry 1990, 156). If economics is a ‘social’ science
it is TBE, not the mainstream theory, that is to be widely-accepted and taught. The fact is,
however, that it is the Marshallian-mainstream theory that is still dominant and has been
taught in economics classes since the publication of Marshall’s Principle of Economics. This
fact lends credence to the Veblenian evolutionary thesis that the dominance and acceptance
of a theory in economics does not depend on the historical relevance, theoretical coherence,
or its rich implications for the real-world problems. Instead, the dominance and acceptance
depends mainly upon the institutional arrangements. Some approaches are discarded simply
because they do not conform to the dominant institutions—that is, the scientific enterprise
dominated and controlled by mainstream economics or, in other words, “they are not pack-
aged in such a way as to engender rapid replication by the research community at large”
(Argyrous and Sethi 1996, 493). It is a mistake to assume that social scientific enterprise is
a self-correcting and progressive process (Yalcintas 2016, 3-42).
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5 Conclusion
Some critics have repeatedly claimed that heterodox economics has failed. They more often
than not blame heterodox economists for their own failure. I have argued in this paper that it
is a mainstream-centered, anti-heterodox claim which can hardly be supported by historical
evidence. Veblen’s evolutionary methodology suggests that the dominance of mainstream eco-
nomics is not because of its ‘scientific success’ but because of the institutional arrangements
in academic economics favoring mainstream economics. Veblen’s approach also implies that
heterodox economics should break completely with mainstream economics and its variants
(dissenters-heretics) if it is be a scientific inquiry into the cumulatively unfolding life process
as we find in the real world. Partial rejection of or integration with mainstream economics
would only lead to the weakening of heterodox economics.
The history of heterodox economics has demonstrated that heterodox economics has sur-
vived as a result of deliberate and concerted efforts of organizing its communities and social
networks, teaching students, and carrying on research agenda in the contested landscape
dominated by mainstream economics. This also means that its future depends on a range of
strategic actions taken presently. It is thus wrong to assume that academic economics is a
market of ideas in which ‘rational’ economists engage in fair competition for the progress in
economics since the market will sort out good theories from bad ones (or the fit from the unfit)
or in which every idea is treated or evaluated on an equal footing. There is no such thing as
the natural selection mechanism in economics. Instead, there is a range of formal and informal
institutions that govern the way how economists theorize and model the world, how they ed-
ucate students, how they evaluate others’ scholarly work, and how they hire their colleagues.
Prevailing ceremonial institutions maintained by mainstream economics have marginalized
and ignored heterodox economics. Consequently, mainstream ideas, theories, and methods
are selected regardless of their irrelevance and incoherence. Major controversies and debates
in economics evidence that the scientific enterprise of economics is not self-correcting. Flawed
or irrelevant mainstream theories are likely to remain dominant since they are the ones en-
dorsed and promoted by the prevailing academic institutions, as well as by those who are
vested in the dominant institutions.
In contrast to critics’ understanding of the state of heterodox economics, I think that het-
erodox economics as scientific enterprise has been successful in terms of growth and research
quality. New communities, social networks, conferences, journals, newsletters, etc. have been
created to promote pluralistic heterodox economics as an alternative to mainstream eco-
nomics. Due to the nature of heterodox economics as a group of various schools of thought
with their own distinctive methodological orientation and theoretical emphasis, it may be
impossible for heterodox economics as a whole to reach a consensus on the core ideas. Nor
would it be possible to find a balance between internal diversity and sufficient consensus
within heterodox economics as Hodgson (2019) wishes. But what’s important is that for the
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past 20 years or so heterodox economics has been evolving and growing. Although the critique
of mainstream economics is still essential part of heterodox economics, heterodox economists
have increasingly paid more attention to their own research agenda. This means that hetero-
dox economics is not merely an opposition to mainstream economics. It has been developing
its own methodology, theory, and policy (see, for example, Jo, Chester and D’Ippoliti 2018b).
The future of heterodox economics is uncertain. It could be better or worse than what it is
now. Only thing we can say is that there will be a better future if heterodox economists keep
struggling to survive in the face of the marginalization and discrimination by the mainstream
economics, developing their theory and policy, and, more importantly, making institutions
that would help promote heterodox economics.
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